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 Introduction 
 
Saudi Prince al-Waleed bin Talal al-Saud has a net worth of $20 billion. Such wealth 
places him first on the Forbes’ 2011 list of World's Billionaires for the Middle-Eastern 
region. Who manages the Prince’s money? The Prince does. The rich tend to rely on the 
“balanced portfolio, 401(k) and insurance” wealth management firms less and less. The 
Middle East’s wealthy’s number less in headcounts… and hold more in assets. Such a 
concentration of wealth has made them a very attractive target for wealth management 
firms. The Middle Eastern affluent, rich and super-rich also tend to hold their money 
abroad, invest most in hard assets (like real estate and commodities) and make large scale 
personal investments in foreign companies – making them a very coveted target for the 
likes of UBS and Merrill Lynch. Yet, the present cherry-picking model of customer 
acquisition will reach its limits – as the wealth spreads out and Middle Eastern banks 
learn how to offer Western-style wealth management services.  
 
Middle-eastern policymakers and bankers will develop an indigenous wealth 
management industry which keeps the super-wealthy’s investments at home. Developing 
a local national wealth management industry requires letting in foreign competition, 
changing banking and securities laws, and growing local companies whose share are 
worth buying. The first part of the article reviews trends in wealth (and wealth 
management) in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. We show that $800 
billion lies-in-waiting for ambitious wealth managers to prospect. We show that foreign 
wealth managers will continue to capture the lion’s share of this wealth because most 
local banks can not compete. In the article’s second part, we show why Turkey has 
succeeded in growing a nationally and internationally competitive wealth management 
industry – whereas Saudi Arabia’s remains less than perfect. Turkish policy (and the 
Turkish wealth management industry) has succeeded (to some extent) because it has 
grown the pool of the wealth. Whereas the Saudi super-rich contently send their money 
abroad, their Turkish counterparts use their funds to develop local industry (though they 
also send quite a lot abroad as well). In the third section, we describe how policymakers 
can help brings the billions abroad home by making business easier, reforming banking 
and securities law, and forcing local banks to become more efficient. In the last section, 
we describe how foreign wealth management firms can increase their assets under 
management in the region. These multi-trillion dollar mammoths should use their 
negotiating power to open MENA markets and grow local multi-millionaires.   
 
The Wealth Management Industry in Perspective 
 
The wealth management industry in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
represents a roughly $800 billion opportunity. Figure 1 shows the total amount of assets 
in the hands of affluent individuals (with more than $100,000 in investable assets), high 
net worth individuals (dollar millionaires or HNWIs as those in the financial industry call 
them), and ultra-high net worth individuals (the UHNWIs, which have at least $30 
million in investable assets). As the Figure shows, wealth in the region lies mostly in 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia -- two countries which we discuss in-depth in the next section. 
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) represents a second tier for wealth 
management firms – with roughly $60 billion to $110 billion in investable assets in the 
hands of the richest 10% of the population in each country. The other countries in the 
region represent ancillary markets (with roughly $20 billion in assets each – or the 
amount of wealth required to make the top 50 in the Forbes 1000).  
 
  
Algeria
Total: $47b
Affluent: 213k
HNWI: 4,100
UHNWI: 35
Morocco
Total: $30b
Affluent: 283k
HNWI: 7,400
UHNWI: 40
Tunisia
Total: $15b
Affluent: 232k
HNWI: 4,460
UHNWI: 60
Libya
Total: $20b
Affluent: 229k
HNWI: 4,400
UHNWI: 55
Egypt
Total: $61b
Affluent: 892k
HNWI: 17,000
UHNWI: 490 YemenTotal: $8b
Affluent: 72k
HNWI: 1390
UHNWI: N/A
Oman
Total: $15b
Affluent: 170k
HNWI: 3,260
UHNWI: 140
UAE
Total: $110b
Affluent: 2.8m
HNWI: 53.8k
UHNWI: 775
Qatar
Total: $35b
Affluent: 216k
HNWI: 4,160
UHNWI: 290
Kuwait
Total: $30b
Affluent: 712k
HNWI: 13.6k
UHNWI: 720
Bahrain – N/A
Lebanon
Total: $12b
Affluent: 224k
HNWI: 4,300
UHNWI: N/A
Jordan
Total: $8b
Affluent: 130k
HNWI: 2,440
UHNWI: N/A
Syria
Total: $17b
Affluent: 82k
HNWI: 1,570
UHNWI: 225
Iraq
Total: $25b
Affluent: N/A
HNWI: N/A
UHNWI: 150
Turkey
Total asset available: $222b     
Affluent: 2.8 million           High Net Worth Individuals: 54, 500              Ultra-High Net Worth: 800
Saudi Arabia
Total assets available: $142b    
Affluent: 1.2 million    High Net Worth Individuals: 23, 200    Ultra-High-Wort:h: 1,225
Figure 1: Turkey and Saudi Arabia are Prime Targets for Primier Banking
Sources: Skolkovo Emerging Market Brief (2012) based on Credit Suisse (2010) and World Bank (2011) for total market sizes,
numbers of affluent and high net worth individuals. Wealth-X (2011) for data on the number of ultra-high net worth individuals 
for each country.  
 
 
In the Middle East, most assets lie in the hands of very few ultra high net worth 
individuals. According to the annual Merrill Lynch-Cap Gemini World Wealth Report for 
various years, North American and European wealth tends to spread out at roughly a ratio 
of $3 million to every ultra and regular high net worth individual in the region. In the 
MENA region (despite the World Wealth’s Report’s data) has ratios closer to 7-to-1. The 
high concentration of wealth in the region provides wealth management and private 
banking firms a unique opportunity to service relatively few ultra high net worth clients – 
without the expense of servicing large numbers of clients. Moreover, the political 
uprisings in the region will likely do little to dampen accumulation of wealth in the 
region. Several studies – the Steiner (2010) study being the most prominent – show 
(rather counter-intuitively) that political uprising has little effect on foreign investment.  
 
The rise of the wealth management industry in the MENA region has been caused by the 
better than average returns to oil investments (combined with their relative volatility). 
Figure 2 shows the way that overall equity prices and oil prices have changed in roughly 
the last 5 years. During the period, oil prices almost doubled at their peak in 2008 and 
halved again in about the same year. In contrast, global equity prices (in general) did not 
fall as much. The standard deviation (the measure of volatility in these prices and thus a 
proxy for risk) was 1.6 times higher for oil than for equities. Higher standard deviations 
for oil prices (and thus incomes based on oil) imply that the Middle East’s wealthy 
require wealth managers who can help them ride out these waves of uncertainty.    
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Figure 2: Major Wealth Management Firms Enter Middle East Based
on the Pull of Oil and Push of Wall Street Financial Crisis
The data in the graph show  the index of iShares S&P Global 100 Index (IOO) and Pow erShares DB Oil Fund (DBO) exchange-traded 
fund prices over the period. Sources: Bloomberg and Business Source Premier.  
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These dramatic changes in the sources of Middle Eastern wealth – and relatively lack-
lustre returns on equities in global equity markets – probably drove the Western broker-
dealer to enter Middle Eastern markets more aggressively (rather than wait for the Middle 
East’s ultra-wealthy to come to them in Europe). On the Figure, we show some (of the 
many) announcements by foreign broker-dealers who increased staff and/or investments 
in wealth management offerings in the Middle East. As of 2012, most of their major 
global banks offer wealth management and private banking in the Middle East.  
 
Global investment houses have expanded their offerings in the Middle East. Such entry – 
particularly by foreign wealth management firms – exacerbates an already existing 
tendency for investors in the MENA region to invest abroad. Middle Easterners send 
roughly 70% of their wealth overseas, as opposed to the US and Japan’s 3% and Western 
Europe’s 25% (Maude, 2006). More recent estimates by the Boston Consulting Group 
place the off-shoring of wealth management-related assets at about 50% (Becerra, 2011).  
 
Yet, academics and policymakers know very little about whose wealth specific goes 
where. Figure 3 shows that estimates for the Middle East region indicate that both the 
number of wealthy individuals grew – and the amount of grew about 10% in 2009 and 
about 5% in 2010. Of that increase, most wealth management watchers (like the Boston 
Consulting Group and Merrill Lynch-Cap Gemini) place most of that money in 
Switzerland and the UK. Yet, IMF data fail to show exactly who invests these funds – 
and from where. According to available data, Emirati, Turkish and Qatari investors place 
the largest amount of their portfolios in Switzerland. Yet, the IMF data showing $1.5 
million in placements falls far short of the estimated $500,000 in Swiss accounts. Such 
data suggest that the IMF need to collect better data (rather than anything specific about 
wealth management clients from the region).  
 
 
 
The limited data available suggest that these wealth management firms are increasingly 
trying to operate directly in MENA countries. Figure 4 shows (for the limited data 
available) that foreign banks have increasingly been participating in Middle Eastern 
markets. At the beginning of the decade, foreign banks comprised only about 10% of the 
total market (by assets). Banks coming from the Arabian Peninsula (from the member 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council) comprised about 27% of assets. By the end of 
the decade, foreign banks made significant progress – taking about 20% of the market. 
Such a trend suggests that Western banks are seeking to capture a larger share of the 
Middle Easterner’s wallet – moving from wealth management to a broader range of 
banking services.  We do not know that all these banks offer wealth management. But, as 
wealth management comprises the most attractive (and discussed) banking sector, we can 
deduce that a fair share of this increase owes to foreign interest in finding wealth 
management and private banking customers.  
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The data in the f igure show  the percent of foreign banks' assets in total banking assets (as derived 
from Bankscope data). Source: Farazi et al.  (2011). 
Figure 4: Non-MENA Banks Making Significant Inroads 
into MENA Banking Markets
GCC banks losing share
Foreign banks gaining ground
 
 
If foreign wealth management firms (particularly in the UK and Switzerland) have 
managed to capture the local market, local wealth management services remain extremely 
under-developed. VRL (2010) – a private consulting company – has indentified the 32 
banks in the region in their profile of wealth management services in the region. Yet, 
looking at their balance sheets, much of their growth still comes from plain vanilla 
banking. Figure 5 shows that the less glamorous business-as-usual banking led to faster 
growth of assets under management (the goal of every banker) than wealth grew in the 
region (and faster than wealth managers could attract that wealth) for 2003-2008. As 
shown, Arabian Peninsula banks (from the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council) grew their assets by about 25% over the second half of the 2000s. Assets under 
management by private bankers and wealth managers increased by about 12% according 
to Merril Lynch-Cap Gemini estimates. Wealth grew in the region as a whole by about 
10%.  
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Figure 5: Banking Likely to Grow Faster than Wealth Management in Middle East
Sources: Hasan and Dridi (2010) for grow th in assets data (from 2003 to 2008). Various years' World Wealth Repor ts 
provide data for the grow th of w ealth estimates and McKinsey (2010) provides estimates of Middle Eastern private 
banking assets under management grow th. 
Banks accumulated
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Could these trends suggest that investments in plain-old banking in the region could yield 
higher growth rates (and larger volumes of assets under management) than playing in an 
increasingly crowded wealth management sector? In the UAE and Qatar (two already 
highly developed financial markets), banking assets grew by about 35% (as more of the 
middle class became affluent). These patterns (judging by past data) seem unlikely to 
change in the near-future. Our two comparator countries for the next section – Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia – saw banking assets grow (as a percent of GDP) by almost double the 
estimated growth rate of wealth in the region. Both these growth rates far exceed the 
growth rates which appear in the wealth management industry estimates.    
 
Non-competitive banking sectors across the region provide one explanation why local 
banks remain under-developed…and why foreign banks hold off from making large-scale 
investments in Middle Eastern wealth management service offerings. Anzoategui and co-
authors (2010), in a study of the MENA banking, describe prevailing market conditions 
as “monopolistic competition.” Figure 6 shows a popular measure of competitiveness – 
known as the H-Index. An H-Index looks at the extent to which banks pass along 
increasing costs by raising fees. Only banks who do not compete at bare-bones profit 
margins of a highly competitive market have the luxury of absorbing parts of these cost 
increases. An H-Index measures the extent to which a bank absorbs these cost increases 
(rather than passes them along). The Anzoategui et al. data show that only UAE (and 
maybe Omani) banks likely operate in a highly competitive environment. Kuwaiti (and 
Turkish) banks seem the most insulated. Other authors corroborate these findings. 
Abbasoglu et al. (2007) find that Turkish banks became increasingly monopolistic in the 
2000s – with falling H-index values from roughly 0.6 to 0.3.  
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Source:  Anzoategui and co-authors (2010). The bars show  the 95% confidence interval for each H-index. 
Figure 6: Most MENA Banking Sectors still uncompetitive
 
 
Another reason for the under-development of local banking (and thus an indigenous 
wealth management industry) may be due to the lack of profitable investment 
opportunities in the region. Banks must take savings – including the savings of ultra-high 
net worth individuals – and place these funds into profitable investments. Yet, according 
to regression analysis by Hasan and Dridi (2010), bank profitability in the MENA region 
has decreased as bank investment portfolios grow. Looking at time series data for the 
MENA region from 2007 to 2009, they find a statistically significant negative correlation 
between banks’ investment portfolio sizes (as a percent of total assets) and bank 
profitability. They also find a positive relationship between bank profitability and the 
percent of real estate and construction lending in banks’ portfolios (which hind-sight tells 
us resulted from the economics of bubble financing). These results – when taken together 
– suggest that MENA banks (at least for the countries the authors looked at) tend to 
destroy value when they invest in MENA markets.  
 
These results may explain why most MENA-based investment funds (and the wealth 
managers that use these funds) do not invest in the MENA region. In a recent study, 
Mako and Sourrouille (2010) analysed the level of inter-MENA region portfolio 
investment. Investment companies, in 5 countries out of the 11 they looked at, have 
significant investments in the MENA region. Of these, Bahraini investors hold the most 
(with $276 million) or 23% of their portfolios. Saudi Arabia -- the largest economy in the 
region (outside of Turkey) – invested only $71 million in the MENA region in 2009 (or 
less than 1%). On a similar scale (through of a much larger proportion), the UAE funds 
invested $92 million in the MENA region (representing roughly 12% of invested funds).  
 
The contrast between the MENA region’s two largest countries (excluding Israel) 
provides some insight in the opportunities and potential pitfalls of expanding wealth 
management services in the Middle East. Turkey represents an example of a successful 
locally grown wealth management industry (kind of). Saudi Arabia represents an under-
developed wealth management industry – one which foreign banks still spirit away funds 
rather than invest them locally. Such wealth management practices have lead to a lack of 
funding to expand Saudi markets for locally-produced affluent, high and ultra-high net 
worth individuals.  
 
Comparing the Region’s Two Key Private Wealth Prospects: Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Comparing Turkish and Saudi wealth creation provides a fascinating glimpse at (and 
forecast of) the future of wealth management in both countries. Both economies have 
organised family interests which control large shares of the economy. However, in 
Turkey, these family-oriented interests focus on local productive economic activities 
which generate wealth. In Saudi Arabia, these family interests tend to invest resource 
gains abroad.  
 
Saudi Arabian companies (and the ultra high net worth individuals than own and control 
them) tend to invest less in diversified and high-tech sectors which will create a larger 
class of affluent bank clients. Figure 7 provides an extremely unrigourous (though 
illustrative) overview of the differences in investment behaviour between Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey. The majority of Turkish economic activity (as measured as a percent of 
GDP) focused on services rather than industry in 2010. In Saudi Arabia, most productive 
enterprise (the result of previous investment decisions) still centres around industry – and 
particularly the oil industry. Saudi Arabian business – at least according to the World 
Economic Forum – ranks 42 places above Turkish business. However, such 
competitiveness will likely increase the wealth of Saudi Arabia’s existing wealthy – 
rather than create more dollar millionaires. Looking at the high-tech and R&D-based 
industries (those industries which have made many of the US’s and Europe’s 
millionaires) provides a clue about the way future economic growth will translate into 
future private wealth clients. In 2007 (the latest year data are available), Turkish high-
tech exports outstripped Saudi ones by a ratio of roughly 8-to1. Turkish companies’ R&D 
expenditure – investment needed to promote sustainable growth and economic 
diversification – eclipsed Saudi expenditure by about 13-to-1. Turkish patents and 
scientific journal articles outnumbered Saudi ones by about 7.5-to-1. Keeping in mind the 
usual caveats about arguing using selected cases, Turkish companies seem to make the 
types of investments which much of the literature suggest lead to higher and more wide-
spread incomes.   
 
Industry Services
Industry Services
R&D development expenditure
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
On a GDP-weighted basis, Turkey spent in 2007 fourteen 
times what Saudi Arabia spend on R&D expenditure. 
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
High-tech Exports (in current US dollar terms)
On a GDP-weighted basis, Turkey spent in 2007 eight times
what Saudi Arabia spend on high technology exports. 
Turkey Saudi 
Arabia
Patents and Scientific Journal 
Articles
Figure 7: Turkey’s Head Start toward a Diversified Economy
Turkey
Saudi
Arabiag
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42
represents the number
of places Saudi Arabia
is above Turkey on the 
World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index
Source: World Bank (2011) and WEF (2011). 
 
 
Such differences in the sources of wealth in the two countries have creates rather 
different distributions of wealth about both countries ultra high net worth individuals (the 
richest according to the popular press stories we reviewed). As shown in Figure 8, 
Turkey’s richest are much less rich than their Saudi counterparts are about one-eight as 
rich as their Saudi counterparts (despite having an economy roughly 1.6 times as large). 
Naturally, drawing conclusions from popular press accounts of the rich-and-famous 
provides little scientifically credible evidence. However, from a practical perspective -- 
the wealth manager who wins the Bin Laden family’s account will have almost 8 times 
more assets under management (and the associated fees) as the one who lands the Zorlu 
account.  
 
 
Figure 8: Ultra-Ultra High Net Worth Individuals in Turkey are a Fraction as Rich 
as their Saudi Counterparts in 2011  
 
Family/ 
Individual 
Company Private 
wealth 
Company 
Assets 
 family’s  
share in top 
40 
Company’s 
share in top 
40 
Saudi Families and Companies 
HRH Prince 
Alwaleed Bin 
Talal Al Saud 
 
Kingdom Holding 
Company 
(Banking) 
$20.4b $25b  9% 3% 
Mohamed Bin 
Issa Al Jaber 
 
MBI International 
Group 
(Real Estate) 
$12b N/A  5% N/A 
The Olayan 
family 
Olayan Group 
(Banking) 
$11.9b N/A  5% N/A 
Mohammad Al 
Amoudi 
Corral Group 
(Energy) 
$10b N/A  4% N/A 
The Bin Ladin 
family 
Bin Ladin Group 
(Construction) 
$9.8b N/A  4% N/A 
Turkish Families and Companies 
Husnu Ozyegin Finansbank 
(Banking) 
$3.5b $22.3b  7% 3% 
Mehmet 
Karamehmet 
Turkcell 
(Communications) 
$2.4b $5.9b  5% 2% 
Erol Sabanci Sabanci Holding 
(Diversified) 
$2.1b $65.8b  4% 2% 
Sarik Tara Enka Construction 
(Construction) 
$2.0b $4b  4% 2% 
Ahmet Zorlu Zorlu Holding 
(Consumer) 
$1.8b $1.4b  3% 1% 
Sources: Arabian Business and Forbes.  See methodological notes for more details.  
 
A look at Turkey’s and Saudi’s richest families reveal other trends of interest to wealth 
managers looking to land accounts like these. Unlike in Turkey, many of Saudi Arabia’s 
largest companies are not public. The lack of public disclosure poses a particular peril – 
given improved know-your-customer requirements in the major financial institutions. 
Turkish wealth comes from diversified companies – whereas (except for Saudi Basic 
Industries), most of the companies making Saudis extremely rich focus on narrow 
economic sectors. Both the Kingdom Holding Company and MBI International Group 
and Partners make a strong point to highlight their London connections on their website.  
 
What does high-tech production and family wealth have to do with wealth management? 
Wealth accumulates from productive activity – and financial institutions store and/or 
channel the proceeds of constructive activity. A healthy local banking sector promotes 
internal investment (and thus the creation of more HNWIs). A healthy local banking 
sector can also compete effectively against foreign wealth management companies. As 
shown in Figure 9, the Saudi banking sector looks just as healthy – if not healthier – than 
the Turkish banking sector in 2010. Saudi banks had more liquid liabilities and more 
deposits to cover them. Saudi banks operated in a more oligopolistic market with higher 
market capitalisation ratios (as a percent of GDP) than their Turkish cousins.  
 
Figure 9: Despite a Seemingly Healthy Banking Sector, Saudis Put Most of their 
Money Abroad 
 
 
Saudi 
Arabia Turkey
Saudi Banks Seems More Consumer Friendly and Healthier 
Saudi Banks More Liquid                         (Liquid Liabilities to GDP Ratio) 67% 45%
Saudi Banks give more credit                          (Private Credit By Deposit  
                                                                                       Money Banks to GDP) 43% 37%
More money put in Saudi Banks                        (Financial System Deposits  
                                                                                                    to GDP Ratio) 55% 42%
Saudi Banks Run More Cheaply         (Bank Overhead Costs / Total Assets) 1% 4%
Both Earn about Same Margins                             (Net Interest Margin) 3% 4%
But Saudi Banks doing little with their better market environment 
Saudi Banks more oligopolistic                           (Bank Concentration ratio) 0.57 0.39
Turkish banks more profitable                                 (Bank Return on Assets) 0.8% 2.1%
Saudi Gross margins lower                                   (Bank Cost-Income Ratio) 59% 30%
Turkish banks farther from default                       (Bank Z-Score (Distance    
                                                                                                          To Default) 10.2 21.4
In a seemingly more market-friendly environment 
Saudis are equity investors                          (Stock Market Capitalization as   
                                                                                                  a percent of GDP) 65% 42%
Saudis have more companies                      (Number of Listed  Companies 
                                                                                              per 1 million people)  7.8 4.3
Because Saudis Send their Money Abroad?  
Saudis More Indebted to Foreigners                 (Loans From Non-Resident    
                                                                                                       Banks to GDP) 35% 17%
Saudis Deposit their Money Offshore               (Offshore Bank Deposits  
                                                                      as ratio of Domestic Bank Deposits) 40% 9%
Note: The figure shows selected financial sector indicators from Beck et al. (2010). Interpretations of these 
figures belong only to the authors.  
 
Saudis save more than Turks do – and they save it off-shore. As a share of GDP, both 
Turkish and Saudi private investment equalled about 20% of GDP in 2010. Yet, Saudis 
saved 43% of their GDP – whereas Turks save only 14% in 2010. Such savings translate 
into wealth management accounts which find their way to Switzerland and the UK. 
Savings – if we resort to high macroeconomic theory – signals a lack of productive 
investment or consumption options... or a desire to put money aside for a rainy day. Saudi 
authorities clearly want to save for a time when their oil-reserves run out (as evidenced 
by their roughly $500 billion sovereign wealth fund). The Turks – want to grow their 
economy today.  
 
The result is that Turkish banks have already broken into the private wealth management 
market – whereas their Saudi colleagues still lack internal markets to develop their 
business. According to the Financial Times Awards for 2011, the best private banks in 
Turkey were both private banks Garanti and Yapi Kredi. As for best bank in the Middle 
East, the best were Western banks -- HSBC, Standard Chartered and Citi. Lending 
patterns among banks also reflect local investment priorities. As shown in Figure 10, 
Saudi banks allocate a much larger share of their loan-able funds on trade and public 
sector (areas which high economic theory would describe as transactional and not directly 
leading to growth in economic output).  
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Source: Hasan and Dridi (2010) - w ith interpretations provided by author. 
Figure 10: Turkish Bank Portfolios Poised to Grow the Affluent Class -  Arab Lending 
Aims at Transactional (less Productive) Activity
 
 
Banks should earn profits from making loans which promote private sector productivity 
and lead to growth. Yet, the data suggest that Saudi bank profits stem from priviledged 
relations with government as much as other factors. Eljelly (2009) finds that having 
connections to government – in the form of state ownership – positively correlates with 
bank performance. In contrast, Hasan and Dridi (2010) finds that government ownership 
of Turkish banks has no impact on bank performance.  
 
Nothing in the data suggests that differences in wealth management prospects between 
the two countries reflect banking efficiency. In other words, foreign wealth manangment 
firms should not expect to enter either market in order to exploit weaknesses of pre-
existing rivals. Figure 11 shows the results of two separate data envelope analyses of the 
banking sector in each country (conducted at about the same time). As shown, the top 
banks in both countries operate at very near best-in-class efficiency. The limited evidence 
available suggests that foreign banks did not improve Turkish bank performance (which 
already had very high levels of efficiency). In a study by Yildirim (2010), he finds that 
foreign bank acquisitions in Turkey did not lead to better bank performance.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Little Room for Improvement in Turkish and Saudi Banking 
(100 represents best-in-class efficiency in each study) 
 
Saudi Arabia (2006)  Turkey (2005) 
SAIB 99.8  Vakif 99
Hollandi 99.7  Ziraat 99
Fransi 99.7  Akbank 98.2
Riyad 98  Halk 98
SAAB 99.7  Koc 97.8
ANB 99.7  Garanti 96.3
SAMBA 92.6  Finans 93
Rajihi 93.7  Fortis 92
Jazira 94  Citi 84.8
Notes: The following represent efficiency scores (using data envelope analysis). Such analysis attempts to 
find a “best-in-class” and then compare all other organisations based on the efficiency of that best in class 
bank. Source: Assaf et al. (2011) for Saudi banks and Abbasoglu et al. (2007) for Turkish banks.  
 
The development of wealth management services look far more promising in Turkey than 
in Saudi Arabia for three reasons. First, more Turks are likely to enter the affluent class 
each year than Saudis – giving aspiring wealth managers an increasing pool of prospects. 
Second, foreign entrants can not exploit the inefficiency (or incompetence) of local 
competitors in these markets like they might in places elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Third, differences in the prospects of wealth management in each country reflect 
fundamental differences in social preferences – between how much money each country 
saves, in which country they save these funds and how they spend their savings when 
they decide to invest them.  
 
Policy Advice for MENA Policymakers  
 
How can the Qatars, Libyas and Lebanons of the region (those countries with fewer 
affluent savers) grow their own affluent (as thus wealth management industries)?  The 
data show that they should encourage local investors to increase their investment time-
horizons (particularly to invest locally rather than abroad). In their book Varieties of 
Capitalism, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) argue that economic systems’ labour, 
product, capital and regulatory environments must “fit together.” The Middle East 
generally has labour, product market, and other policies which encourage long-term 
planning and investing. However, as shown in the left panel of Figure 12, most denizens 
of their banking sectors focus decidedly on short-term results. The average Qatari, 
Kuwaiti, or Saudi will want large rates of return in under 2 years. Their Western 
counterparts will be content to take a longer-term view – holding investments yielding 
half the amount desired by the Saudi for almost 3 times as long. Such preferences yield a 
more “patient capitalism” which has led to long-run growth. Turkish investors tend to 
have higher expectations for their investments (understandable given recent Turkish 
equity price growth). However, they are also willing to wait twice as long to get these 
returns.1 A client who wants to change his or her portfolio every year or two represents 
one of a professional wealth managers’ worst nightmares.    
 
Figure 12: Short-termist capital can not finance a  
long-termist view of national development 
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The other key to developing the local wealth management industry (and thus economic 
development) consists of encouraging ultra high net worth individuals to bring their 
money home. As shown on the right-side panel of Figure 8, Middle Eastern countries 
which have easier business index scores (as measured by the World Bank’s Doing 
Business database) tend to have more patient investors. The Bahraini investor will have a 
longer time horizon, because doing business is easier. The Kuwaiti will have very short 
time horizons – partially because leaving his or her money tied up too long exposes him 
or her to all kinds of regulatory and business risks. Saudi Arabia proves the exception – 
they have short time horizons and business regulations which making doing business very 
easy. Making business easier should also lengthen time horizons – because Saudi, Omani 
and Qatari investors know that their investments will not stagnate in a bureaucratic mire.  
 
Changes in investment law clearly affect the ease of business and the development of a 
local wealth management industry. Figure 13 provides an assessment of the development 
of a local (national) wealth management industry – looking only at black letter banking 
and securities law. Not exactly surprising results emerge. Prospects look best in countries 
-- like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – which already have relatively well-developed 
financial sectors. The analysis suggests that countries like Tunisia and the UAE could 
develop more quickly if they generalised their zona franca approach to finance. Both 
countries have a financial centre with relatively few restrictions (Tangiers and Dubai 
respectively). Their zona franca status has allowed both countries to come wealthy 
quickly. However, to continue growing their wealth (and thus their wealth management 
industries), they will need to extend reforms beyond isolated geographical areas. 
Countries like Yemen, Oman, Algeria and Syria require nothing less than a full-scale 
rewriting of their banking and securities laws.  
 
 
1 available online. 
Figure 13: Prospects for Foreign Wealth Management Entry into  
Various MENA Countries 
 
Country Prospects for Wealth Management Industry Based on Existing Legal 
Provisions 
Algeria Poor - the government should amend the banking law to better guarantee the right 
of local and foreign firms to enter the wealth management sector. Better protections 
for engaging in domestic and international securities transactions required. 
Egypt Average -government should encourage entry in the banking sector and define the 
terms under which securities dealers may transact at home and abroad. 
Jordan Good - bank and securities law looks similar to Western best practice. 
Lebanon Poor – government sets a negative tone toward wealth management in its Basic 
Decision No 7074 and should liberalize foreign participation in the banking sector. 
Government should define clear regulations for finding and managing funds on 
local and international markets. 
Morocco Average – Tangier represents one of the few financial zona francas in the region. 
The ability to solicit business and manage funds outside the zone remain uncertain.   
Oman Poor - current law gives few legally defendable rights to domestic and international 
financial institutions. Significant revisions in banking and securities legislation 
required. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Good - Law provides (at least on paper) a stable framework for encouraging long-
term investments by wealth management providers. 
Syria Poor - law difficult to find and seems to provide uncertain rights and obligations for 
local and international financial institutions. 
Tunisia Average – despite significant revisions in law, both banking and securities law can 
increase clarity of financial institutions’ rights (particularly the right to engage in 
financial services needed by the affluent). 
Turkey Good – law appears to provide a sound basis for long-term banking and securities 
investments. 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
Average – the financial free zones, while themselves representing a liberal 
regulatory framework which encourage wealth management investments, can be 
changed or revoked. These zona francas should be incorporated into national law to 
provide the long-term predictability needed to expand the UAE’s current status.   
Yemen, 
Rep. 
Poor – existing law making banking of all kinds extremely difficult. Significant 
legal redrafting needs to be done in banking and securities law. 
Source: author, based on database provided by the World Bank. See Appendix II for legislation under 
review.  
 
However, once the money comes home – savings in the hands of foreign wealth 
managers comes home, these funds should be put to work in the MENA economies. 
Despite its lack of sex appeal, consumer lending still represents the best way of growing 
MENA region banks (and the number of affluent savers in the region). Figure 14 shows 
the results of Hasan and Dridi’s (2010) regression analysis – looking at the effect of 
several variables on bank performance. As previous discussed, putting this money into 
managed accounts of stocks and bonds does little to help these banks (or economies) 
grow. Instead, the data show that plain vanilla lending probably still serves as the best 
market segment for local banks to prepare themselves for direct competition with their 
much larger and more sophisticated rivals in the US and Switzerland. Almost all the 
literature suggests that banks can increase assets under management by offering Islamic 
financial products. However, as we discuss in Figure 15, we do not discuss the role of 
such finance in this policy brief.  
 
Figure 14: What Causes Local Banks to Grow and Expand their  
Base of Wealthy Customers? 
 
Variable  Significant Sign  Interpretation 
 
What causes local banks to grow? 
Investment portfolio to 
total assets 
NO - Portfolio investments by banks (the kind which 
normal wealth managers do) doesn’t go local banks’ 
assets 
Consumer loans YES  POS Vanilla lending still the way to grow a bank   
Real Estate loans to total NO  Real estate lending has not been good for banks 
Leverage (assets to 
capital) 
NO - Leverage does not help MENA banks grow quickly 
and sustainably  
Islamic Finance YES POS Investors put money into banks which offer Islamic 
lending products 
Size NO - Being big does not help a bank attract customers 
    
What causes these banks to create an affluent class? 
Consumer loans YES POS Lending helps customers invest (or at least consume) 
Real estate lending YES POS Credit expansion caused (at least in part) by expansion 
in lending  
Bank deposits to total YES POS Banks lent out money they get in deposits 
Leverage  NO - Offering banks debt does not help expand credit  
Islamic Finance YES POS Banks  
Size NO - The convention wisdom – that customers prefer big 
banks because they are safer – does not seem to hold.  
Note: The dependent variable for the first set of variables is the change in assets. The second set of 
variables talk to credit growth (a flow rather than a stock variable) between 2008 and 2009.    
Source: Hasan and Dridi (2010).  
 
Figure 15: What Role Does Islamic Finance Have in Your Study? 
 
For the extant data, the offer of Islamic financial products has a very strong impact on the choice 
of a wealth manager (and the growth of asset managers which offer these products). However, 
because of varying levels of secularisation across the MENA region, we decided not to include 
the influence of Islamic financial products as a factor in our analysis. The understanding of these 
products – and design across jurisdictions – makes direct comparison nigh-well impossible. The 
success of Western offering of these products in Europe does not immediately suggest that such 
offerings locally would provide local banks with a competitive advantage. Thus, we  
 
Significant evidence suggests that foreign participation in MENA banks can improve 
services (including wealth management services). Kobeissi (2010) finds a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the number of majority-owned foreign banks in 
a country return on bank assets, bank, bank equity and profitability. Abbasoglu et al. 
(2007) find the same phenomenon for Turkish banks – finding a statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of foreign banks and return on assets. In their 
regression analysis, they find that foreign ownership affected return on equity and return 
on assets far more than even increases in operating efficiency. Haddad and Hakim (2010) 
find that foreign banks did not help “import” the financial crisis into Saudi Arabia. Any 
attempt to protect local financial service market likely backfires – stifling innovation.  
 
Strategies for Foreign Wealth Management Firms 
 
In the short-term, foreign broker-dealers entering Middle Eastern wealth management 
markets should focus on three things. First, they should try to capture assets held abroad 
rather than enter Middle Eastern markets directly. With 50%-70% of wealth located in 
Zurich and Jersey, a wealth manager would do better to prospect for Middle Eastern 
money in Europe than in their clients’ home countries. Second, wealth managers should 
focus on the “big fish” (maximising assets under management rather than the number of 
clients). In this respect, the family office model will probably develop more than the 
financial advisor model (with their roughly 50 to 500 clients) per advisor in the US, Asia 
and Europe. Third, they should focus on “second tier” markets – because Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia (while big) also have very competent competitors.  
 
Competition is not only about market size – but also about rivalry. Figure 16 shows 
technical efficiency estimates for banks in the MENA region – as reported by Ben-
Naceur et al. (2011). As of 2008 (for which more recent data are available), Moroccan 
banks pose the most serious threat to foreign entrants (having a technical efficiency 
above those in the authors’ comparator country Portugal). Egypt and Jordan – in terms of 
efficiency – seem the best targets for foreign banks (considering low efficiency of local 
banks and ignoring important issues like poor legislation and capital controls). These data 
also show that considerations about rivalry are not set in stone -- technical efficiency can 
change significantly over time. In the time period Ben-Naceur and his co-authors study, 
Lebanese banks made significant efficiency improvements; whereas Tunisian banks 
became significantly less efficient over the same time period.  
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Figure 16: Rivalry lowest in Egypt and Highest in Morocco
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The big wealth management advisors like UBS, Barclays and RBS will do well to 
consider long-term investments in wealth-management in the Middle East. No country 
(with the exception of Turkey and maybe Saudi Arabia) have local banks which rival the 
service offerings of the big players. Barclays can offer access to derivatives, commodities 
(called “alternative investments in the industry”) and a range of IPOs which other firms 
have late access to. These companies’ analysts have access to the Boards of the 
companies they invest in – in a way that Middle Eastern banks can not compete with. 
These firms can compete. Local financial institutions – whose management read the same 
Euromoney and Banker literature as the management of the global players – will want to 
participate in the wealth management boom. Developing these markets now will help 
forestall potential local competition later.  
 
In the longer-term, the large international wealth management firms like BNP Paribas 
and Merrill Lynch (just to cite some examples) should develop the future HNWI segment 
(which comprise today’s affluent middle class). This segment will provide most of their 
margins in the long-term. Such development consists of engaging with local governments 
– encouraging them to implement the advice we give above. They do not need to engage 
in a social movement. As shown in Appendix II, each of the countries have an investment 
promotion law. Foreign asset management companies – with assets under management 
larger than the GDPs of most of the countries in the region – should not shy away from 
negotiating better (and pro-economic growth) access. In this way, their portfolio 
managers can spend a bit more time and energy finding local investments rather than 
jetting in from Zurich and New York.   
 
Reducing capital controls will be one of the first points of discussion between 
governments and these global asset management firms. Figure 17 presents data from the 
Chinn and Ito capital control index. Countries on the Arabian Peninsula have few capital 
controls and restrictions (which correlate with rapidly increasing levels of wealth). North 
African countries (with the exception of Egypt) have relatively closed capital markets. 
These countries correlate with relatively small markets for wealth management. Turkey 
represents the exception that proves the rule – having many capital market restrictions 
(not surprising given three financial crises in the last 20 years). Opening up these markets 
can only help the wealthy (and wealthy-to-be) in these countries.  
 
 
Figure 17: Capital Controls still pose a barrier to 
Wealth Management Firm Entry in much of the Region 
 
 
Developing a class of HNWIs would serve the asset managers as well. Figure 18 provides 
illustrations for reasons why international wealth management firms militating for 
banking, securities and private sector reform in the MENA region. In terms of increasing 
margins, the graph on the left shows that smaller investors tend to pay more for services 
than UHNWIs. Clients bringing in up to $1 million pay roughly 1.5% in commissions 
and fees on their assets. Clients who bring in $100 million or more, tend to pay roughly 
half of one percent. For the same $100 million, wealth managers should prefer (if we 
ignore costs) to serve many customers rather than one. On the macroeconomic side of the 
argument (and to repeat studies too numerous to cite here), countries which make doing 
business easy tend to see expanding levels and distributions of wealth. Once parliaments 
in the MENA region revise business legislation, the number and value of wealthy 
management clients will increase. Of course, the correlation is far for perfect – as rich 
Qatar has the same ease of doing business rank as much poorer per capita Morocco. Yet, 
the pattern seems clear.  
 
 
Figure 18: Developing a Class of HNWIs is Good for Business 
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Opening up these markets would also help foreign wealth management firms develop 
long-term relationships with their clients. The academic literature reaffirms what any 
practising wealth manager knows intuitively. Personal relationships affect their ability to 
accumulate assets more than other factors (like how profitably they manage portfolios or 
how efficient their bank office operations are). Cheng et al. (2010) put to the test the 
usual factors which McKinsey, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and other advisors to the 
wealth managers survey about. They find – using regression analysis – that personal and 
professional connections with the wealth manager statistically significantly correlate 
more than other factors (like the rate of return the wealth manager makes for his or her 
client or the wealth manager’s firm size). If the international wealth management firms 
want to capture a share of the future MENA wealth management market, they will need 
to locate in their markets. .   
 
The final reason the big foreign wealth management firms should  develop MENA 
markets consists in the diversification potential these markets offer the large international 
wealth managers. In a study of MENA markets, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) find 
that portfolios which included MENA shares tended to have higher risk-adjusted returns 
than those without – because of the diversification potential of these shares. Even 
splitting the MENA into oil-producing and non-oil producing markets, Mansourfar and 
his co-authors (2010) also find significant diversification gains from investing in these 
countries’ firms. These gain mean – in simple language – that the big firms can get higher 
returns (or lower the risk the take for the same level of returns) by putting MENA shares 
in their portfolios. Having offices and local analysts will MENA countries will help these 
firms find the best assets – and help them to develop these assets at the same time.  
 
Foreign entrants should resist the temptation to partner with government-owned banks. 
Kobeissi (2010) and Farazi et al. (2011) find (overall for the region) that government 
ownership exercises a negative influence on bank profits. In a wealth management 
context, partnering with state owned institutions poses an obvious danger – as many 
ultra-high-income-individuals seek to place funds abroad to escape local regulation 
and/or taxation. Several other authors repeat this conclusion – providing statistics for 
banking sectors with high levels of government ownership. For some of these countries, 
avoiding government participation will pose a challenge. In 2008, Farazi et al. find that 
government has a 94% share in Libyan banks, 90% in Algeria, 69% in Syria, 57% in 
Egypt (57%), 43% in Tunisia, 37% in Morocco (37%), and 28% in the Gulf Co-operation 
Council countries overall. Yet, little government ownership does not guarantee a 
productive banking sector – as Yemen’s 13% and Jordan as well as Lebanon’s 0% 
government stake can attest to.  
 
Current and potential entrants should also not overlook the potential profits of regular 
banking in the MENA region. If asset managers simply want to maximise assets under 
management, then the retail and commercial banking markets could be the best way to do 
that. Figure 19 shows the potential market size for gathering assets (in the form of the 
total number of deposits in various MENA country banks). The aspiring asset manager 
could gather over $250 billion in Egypt and Algeria. The convention wisdom – that 
wealth management and super-rich investors – represent the “best” market segment to 
concentration on still has to be proven.  
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Figure 19: Could Wealth Managers Find that the McDonald's Strategy
is more profitable than serving Filet Mignon?
The data in the Figure show  the total amount of deposits (on a US dollar basis) for most of the countries in the MENA region. 
Source: Beck et al . (2011). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Wealth management in the Middle East represents both a boon and a potential bust for 
local and international financial institutions. The future of wealth management in the 
Middle East will depend on whether policymakers and bankers can develop a local 
wealth management services which grow local economies (and thus increase the number 
and portfolios of affluent individuals). Policymakers will need to encourage local 
financial institutions to become more competitive by letting in foreign competition, 
changing banking and securities laws, and growing local companies whose share are 
worth buying. Foreign wealth managers need not fear the development of stronger local 
wealth management institutions and practices. They should use their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Middle Eastern governments to make it easy to find and use locally-based 
wealth managers. They should also grow the market – by providing normal as well as 
private banking services. By offering higher rates of return to the affluent-to-be, these 
foreign wealth management firms can grow their market sizes… and capture their share 
of the $800 billion already waiting for them.  
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Appendix I: Local laws on their effect on the foreign wealth management industry 
 
The following presents a sample of investment laws from the region. We show the law 
and reasons why specific provision encumber the growth of a domestic wealth 
management industry.2  We make no guarantees that the laws we have reviewed 
represent legislation or regulation in effect at the time we reviewed them.  
 
The Law Comments 
Algeria 
Ordinance 01-03 of 20 August 2001 on Investment Development provides the basic tax and customs 
incentives defined in investment promotion laws across the MENA region.  
Banking Law 90-10 of 10 April 10 1990 places primary responsibility for regulating the banking sector 
with the Bank of Algeria. Few other laws are available – and available evidence suggests that the Bank of 
Algeria governor decides which banks may operate in Algeria.   
Egypt  
Presidential Decree No. 187 of 1993 Issuing the Executive Regulations of the Banks and Credit Law 
requires foreign banks (or banks with more than 50% ownership) to guarantee deposits in case of bank 
failure (art. 4.6) and information about foreigners working in the branches in Egypt.  
Law No. 88 of 2003 Promulgating the Law of the Central Bank, the Banking Sector 
and Money authorises foreign banks to operate (article 35). The law requires these banks to join the 
national self-regulating organisation and be subject to national oversight (article 54). Article 111 guarantees 
the right to transact and deal in foreign currencies.  
The Investment Law No. 8 of 1997 represents Egypt’s version of legislation offering investors tax 
incentives, customs exemptions and protections against appropriation.  
Jordan 
Banking Law No. 28 of 2000 provides a liberal regime for the regulation of foreign banks operating in 
Jordan. Article 11 lays out the procedures for the licensing of foreign banks. Securities Law No. 76 of 
2002 looks like similar laws in the US and Europe. Unlike the other countries in the region, Jordanian 
banking and securities law seems relatively unremarkable.  
Lebanon 
Article 1 of the Basic Decision No 7074 of the Bank of Lebanon Relating to Collective Investment 
Schemes explicitly forbids any foreign wealth management or bank from soliciting for funds in Lebanon 
without prior consent from the Bank’s Board. The rest of the decision describes the conduct of investment 
promotion activities in the country.  
Law 360 of 2001 Encouraging Investments in Lebanon outlines many of the exemptions, tax incentives 
and other enticements given to foreign investors.  
Law 234 of 10 June 10 2000 On Regulating the Financial Intermediation Profession restricts financial 
activities to those licensed by the (Central) Bank of Lebanon. The law sets forth restrictions on the amount 
of foreign ownership (article 5) and generally sets forth the conditions for foreign financial institutions 
wishing to operate in Lebanon. Other relevant legislation includes Law 706 of 2005 on Collective 
Investment Schemes in Securities and Other Financial Instruments and Law 99 of 1991 Regarding 
Lebanese and Foreign Banks. 
Morocco 
Law 18 of 1995 Establishing an Investment Charter aims to replace the nine investment laws in force. 
The Charter (of uncertain legal and regulatory validity and status) grants the usual benefits to foreign 
investors in the areas of tax and customs.  
Law 34 of 2003 on Credit and Financial Institutions represents an unremarkable legislative instrument 
outlining the organisation and structure of the banking sector.  
Law No. 58-90 on Off-shore Financial Markets basically creates a financial free zone  (much as the UAE 
has done) with its own rules with regard to transacting with foreign financial institutions. Foreign banks 
may operate with few rules in Tangiers.  
                                                 
2 Doing Business Law Library, available online. We sorted by Banking and Credit Laws, Commercial and 
Company Laws, and Securities Laws.  
Oman 
Master Circular BM-997 on Lendings to Non-Residents and Placements of Bank Funds Abroad of 
2006 restricts the placement of bank funds abroad of foreign bank branches operating in Oman. Banks are 
allowed to keep 20% of net worth in foreign currency (point 6.1). Banks should (as per point 6.6) report 
any placements abroad within the following month. Royal Decree 102/94 Law on the Issuing the Foreign 
Capital Investment limits foreign ownership of companies to 49% (rising to 65% with a recommendation 
from the Foreign Capital Investment Committee and the approval of the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry). Capital participation may rise to 100% for small projects of special development interest. These 
restrictions may be waived by special agreement of the Government. Article 4 requires licensing of foreign 
investment. Article 8 defines special industries. The law also gives dispensations of customs duties.   
The Instruction for Establishment of Omani Companies Subject to Commercial Companies Law and 
Foreign Business and Investment Law establishes limits on the amount of foreign capital (point 6) and 
the types of sectors foreigners may participate in (point 7). The instruction also requires 5 years relevant 
previous commercial experience and the explicit consent of relevant government agencies (point 8).  
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Securities and Investment Fund law closely resembles international norms. Banking Control Law of 
June 1966 allows foreign banks to operate in the Kingdom, subject to licensing.  
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Regulations for Investment Funds and Collective Investment 
Schemes Circular of 1993 describe restrictions on both foreign financial institutions operating in Saudi 
Arabia and Saudi institutions wishing to operate abroad. Point 1 of the circular forbids foreign financial 
institutions from offering banking services in the Kingdom. Point 3 specifically requires Monetary Agency 
to approve in advance any monies sent abroad.  
The Foreign Investment Act of April 2000 stipulates that General Investment Authority license Foreign 
Capital Investment (as defined in article 2 of the Law). While foreign investors possess the same general 
rights – with some exceptions include restrictions on real estate investment (article 8).  Executive Rules of 
the Foreign Investment Act refer to firms wholly-owned by foreign investors (article 4.2), outlines 
benefits and incentives given to foreign investors (article 5) and principally describes licensing procedures 
(articles 6-19).  
Syrian Arab Republic 
Investment Promotion Law No. 10 (as amended by Legislative Decree No. 7 of 13 May 2000 outlines the 
rights of the foreign investor. The law covers many of the basic rights we take for granted in the West, 
including the usual guarantees against appropriation (article 3) and right of abode (article 4) and tax 
incentives (outlined in Chapter 2). Funds may be remitted annually (after settling taxes). Amendments 
allow company management to decide company wages, appointments and other HR decisions.  
Tunisia 
Law 2001-65 of the 10th July 2001 on Credit Agencies establishes a system of mutual recognition for 
foreign investment agencies and banks registered in Tunisia (article 12).   
Law 85-108 of the 6th December 1985 on Promoting Banking and Financial Organisations working 
principally with non-residents guarantees the rights of foreign financial organisations without the 
discriminations found in much MENA law.  
Law No. 93-120 Promulgating the Investment Incentives Code establishes incentives for investing in 14 
sectors of the Tunisian economy (such as agricultural, manufacturing and other “productive” activities). In 
general, the law sets up a complex system of benefits. Article 3 restricts foreign participation to a 50% 
stake in the local company and licensing by the Higher Investment Commission. Article 12 allows foreign 
companies to opt-out of the Tunisian pension contribution scheme.  
Turkey  
Banking Law No. 5411 and    Banks Act No. 4389 provide unremarkable regulation of Turkish banks.  
Law No. 4875 on Foreign Direct Investment provides the general framework for guaranteeing foreign 
investors the basic rights found in similar documents across the region (such as national treatment and 
freedom from appropriation). Article 34 of the Law 2499 of 1981 on Capital Market grants the Capital 
Market Board the right to establish the principles for regulating foreign financial institutions. 
Free Trade Zones Act dated 6 June 1985 in theory provides the same kind of inducements like Tangiers 
and Dubai to set up special banking zones. However, the Government has not allowed any particular 
financial free zones at this time.  
 
United Arab Emirates 
Federal Law 8 of 2004 Regarding the Financial Free Zones creates areas which are exempt of the 
generally higher level of regulations. Article 2 makes these zones completely self-regulating. Law No. 12 
of 2004 on the Judicial Authority at Dubai International Financial Centre represents an example of a 
specific zone created under this legal framework.  
The Federal Act No. 18 of 1981 Concerning Organizing Trade Agencies and the Commercial 
Companies Law No. 8 of 1984  forbid foreigners from owning more than 49% of a company (including an 
investment company) and require the use of an agent to engage in foreign trade.  
Yemen 
Law no 38 of 1998 on Commercial Banks represents a pedestrian banking law. Article 5 requires license 
from Central Bank to engage in banking activities. Article 10 defines restrictions on bank capital 
management, mergers and other activity. The law gives effect to various provisions in the Islamic Banking 
Law which restrict banks’ investment activities (article 20 and 21).  
The Investment Law No. 22 of 2002 provides a highly detailed account of the rights and obligations of 
foreign investment projects operated in Yemen. Article 9 requires 15% “preference” price reduction. 
Article 13 allows for nationalization if in the public interest. Article 17 calls for a pro-Yemeni bias in 
employment. 
Law No. 23 of 1997 on Arrangement of Agencies, Branches of Companies and Foreign Trade Houses 
represents a highly restrictive piece of legislation which makes the practice of foreign investment and 
banking extremely difficult. Some examples include Article 4 requires Yemenis only to hold capital in the 
company. Article 6 requires authorization from “the competent ministry in advance.” The law also requires 
review of the agency contract with the foreign financial institution. Article 9 requires the submission of 
fees. Article 17 prevents imports unless approved in advance.  
Source: Author and World Bank Doing Business Law Library.  
Note: Iraq omitted due to likely changes in laws. Dates on Saudi laws have been converted into equivalent 
Gregorian calendar dates.  
 
 
